Introduction
As we commemorate the 75th anniversary of the establishment of NATO, let us take the time to reflect on the complex, dynamic, multipolar world in which the Alliance finds itself. The ever-evolving security landscape, beset on multiple fronts and domains by Russian aggression in Europe, multiple crisis in the Middle East, and increasing tensions in the Indo-Pacific, presents both tremendous challenges as well as extraordinary opportunities for the NATO alliance over the next 25 years. At the tactical and operational levels, our warriors are challenged daily by contested airspace, hybrid warfare, and rapid technological proliferation by state and non-state actors, which threaten their ability to operate and effectively deter emerging threats. Meanwhile, at the strategic level the Alliance must continually reorient to the shifting geopolitical environment and seize opportunities as they arise, enhancing stability, positively influencing the global security environment, and upholding international law.
At all levels of command, there is plenty of room for optimism. In its 75-year history, the Alliance has constantly innovated, adapted, and reshaped itself to meet the challenges of its time, preserving peace and promoting stability. It has grown from 12 members in 1949 to 32 in 2024, enhanced its interoperability, and cultivated countless relationships through the Partnership for Peace program and other initiatives to ‘build trust and, in the long run, prevent conflict’.1 In short, NATO’s long-term key to success is, first and foremost, its ability to innovate in advance of would-be aggressors. NATO understands that a complex global chessboard is the rule, not the exception, and it recognizes the urgency to continually improve its strategy, doctrine, and tactics to guarantee that individual liberty, human rights, democracy, and the rules-based international order are protected.
Lesson’s Identified
Yet as the world grows increasingly interconnected, NATO has an interest in peace and stability beyond the Euro-Atlantic and must grapple with challenges originating from state and non-state actors further abroad. This wider aperture will necessitate political consensus within NATO, as well as new regional partnerships, enhanced info and intelligence sharing agreements, and investment and innovation in new capabilities with sufficient capacity for the future operating environment. Three recent examples highlight the challenges, opportunities, and strategic foresight needed as NATO continues to fulfil its defensive mission of deterrence, crisis prevention, and cooperative security.
First, in the Red Sea, the Houthis have proven a formidable challenge to the rules-based international order threatening the shipping bottleneck of Bab el-Mandeb, aptly translated as the ‘Gate of Grief’. Despite being a non-state actor, they have effectively used anti-ship ballistic missiles and low-cost drones to disrupt a vital shipping route. While NATO efforts have blunted the effectiveness of the Hothi attacks, the crisis continues, and the consequences persist. As of the spring of ‘24, shipping companies were rerouting over 50% of Suez traffic, impacting global markets and increasing prices for the ordinary consumer.
Thus, strategic thinking and adaptability are critical for NATO as it confronts the Houthi threat, and difficult questions must be asked. What challenges and opportunities can we identify in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden? Is there capacity within the Alliance to patrol the air and sea outside of traditional NATO airspace? Do we have the capacity to sustain a persistent defensive operation? Have we developed appropriate partnerships and info sharing agreements in the region? These are the type of questions we hope to answer during the conference, and they require our collective thinking to resolve.
Second, the defence of Israel from Iran’s attack on the 13th of April demonstrated the efficacy of a prepared and well-resourced air defence system. The coalition involved used a layered integrated air defence, successfully defending against a barrage of 170 drones, 30 cruise missiles, and 120 ballistic missiles.2 Multiple nations were involved, all with varying agreements amongst themselves to share information, release airspace, and intercept Iranian munitions. All drone and cruise missiles were destroyed prior to reaching Israeli airspace, leaving only a few ballistic missiles for the famed ‘Iron Dome’ to intercept. The end-result of 300 munitions was a single ballistic missile hitting a hangar at a military airbase.3 Israel’s defence highlighted what cooperation, intel sharing, and a recognized air picture coupled with a capable, layered, and sufficiently resourced Integrated Air and Missile Defence can accomplish: a 99% interception rate. Is NATO ready to employ the same level of Integrated Air and Missile Defence in our home countries?
Third, looking further beyond to the Indo-Pacific, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) pose systemic challenges to NATO’s security. Here we have seen persistent and malign hybrid, cyber, and disinformation campaigns coupled with rapid space and ballistic missile development, and defended by a significant Anti-Access Area Denial (A2AD) capability. In addition, both nations are transporting weapons and dual use commercial systems and raw materials to the Russian Federation, becoming decisive enablers of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which is ‘the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security.’4 Events on the opposite side of the world have a direct impact on NATO security at home, and we must look at the world as increasingly global and interconnected.
The Need for Continual Innovation
NATO airpower must evolve beyond its traditional capabilities and experience, becoming a globally relevant instrument for deterrence and crisis management. Thew Houthi and Israel examples above highlighted what air power can accomplish by blunting adversarial attacks. Contrasting the two air defence examples against Ukraine’s air defence highlights two key factors: distance and capacity. Ukraine, using a mix of new and old systems with limited stockpiles, successfully intercepts roughly 4 out of 5 Russian munitions. Shorter distances (and therefore reduced reaction time) and a lack of airborne fighter interceptors and early warning aircraft are two important distinctions between Israel’s 99% and Ukraine’s 80% interception rates. Applying the factors of distance and capacity, NATO should expand its ability to surveil beyond its borders and significantly improve its numbers of active and passive defensive systems and stockpiles of associated munitions to provide credible deterrence based on its capabilities and the ability sustain its defence over time.
A credible defence capability is only one portion of a successful deterrence strategy. Partner states’ cooperation and willingness to share intel and information assisting in Israel’s defence on the 13th of April showed Iran that the region was united against regional expansion of hostilities, which has deterred any further direct Iranian action for now. NATO must replicate this lesson en-masse and apply relationship building and operational integration throughout the world in order to avoid a terrorist organization like the Houthis from disrupting worldwide trade. In response to emerging global challenges, NATO continues to adapt. NATO nations have expanded their diplomatic and military engagement in the Indo-Pacific, first by initiating ‘flagship projects’ with partners in the region, including new support agreements for Ukraine, and new industrial collaboration pacts with Indo-Pacific partners. Additionally, it is sending units to major exercises in 2024, including a naval strike group, and air defence units to Exercise ‘Pitch Black,’ an Australian ‘Red Flag Level’ large force exercise. NATO nation’s ability to send units to the far side of the world shows would-be aggressors that we can credibly sustain our operations and work interoperably with like-minded nations wherever they may be. But is ‘showing the flag’ and working with our partners enough to dissuade other nations from using military action to accomplish their national objectives?
Navigating the turbulent skies of the 21st century requires a bold yet nuanced approach to airpower. By acknowledging the challenges and seizing the opportunities presented by a transformed world, air forces can remain versatile and indispensable instruments of national and global security. NATO’s journey over the next 25 years demands adaptability, partnerships, and a willingness to push the traditional boundaries of what airpower has achieved. The future is uncertain, but one thing is clear: airpower will remain a critical force shaping the world order, and its evolution will be crucial in navigating the challenges and opportunities that lie ahead. Despite this uncertainty, the Alliance will remain critical to the stability of world order, and its continued evolution will be crucial in navigating the challenges and opportunities that lie ahead.
