Introduction
Enhancements in connectivity have significantly evolved warfare with regards to the variety of means and their speed in creating effects in the physical, virtual, and cognitive dimensions. Connectivity has always existed in various forms to relay commanders’ orders and ingest intelligence from the battlefield, but the current operating environment requires distributed and diverse pathways through all five domains to support the flow of data with enough agility and resilience to achieve a superior decision cycle. Connectivity in the physical and virtual dimensions extends and improves command and control (C2) and accelerates intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), and targeting cycles, which ultimately speeds up the observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) loop to achieve cognitive superiority over the adversary.
The war in Ukraine has highlighted the proliferation of affordable, easily manufactured technologies, and distributed nodes to achieve asymmetric effects. Ukraine is using those two concepts—distribution and connectivity—to achieve success against a larger and better funded adversary, showcasing the evolution of the battlefield. While Ukraine may have rapidly adopted commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) capabilities for their own means of survival, NATO must recognize that these trends are applicable beyond today’s war and the lessons learned from Ukraine will be applied disruptively and globally by current and future adversaries. To remain competitive, NATO must aggressively innovate capabilities that integrate connected and distributed sensors and nodes. While connectivity across all domains is vital, this article will focus on how enhancements to NATO’s newer domains, cyber and space, can evolve the battlefield.
Commercial Capabilities in Ukraine
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, both sides have repurposed commercial technology for C2, ISR, and kinetic operations. Facing a superior Air Force, Ukraine made use of small and affordable commercial UASs to conduct ISR and strikes, enabling them to field significant numbers of attritable and hard-to-target capabilities asymmetrically. The value proposition is clear, despite being individually less exquisite than contemporary military capabilities, small UASs distributed in larger numbers deliver similar effects while reducing risk to own force. Having reduced costs and risk-to-force, this new class of air power becomes a scalable means to achieve effects. Beyond small UASs, there have been adaptations of commercial technology that Russia and Ukraine have both used for connectivity. Within the cyberspace domain, a lesser-known development has been the integration of the ordinary smartphone into ISR and targeting cycles.
According to the US Army Training and Doctrine Command G2, smartphones have been used to crowdsource UAS path tracking, aggregate data for common operating pictures (COPs), aid counterfire targeting, and reveal enemy order of battle.1 The prevalent nature of smartphones greatly contributes to a distributed sensor network by sending real-time data to processing repositories that illuminate the battlefield. Ukraine has developed specialized software applications that can gather reports on Russian UAS sightings from citizens which military forces can then use to predict likely enemy UAS trajectories, thereby providing early warning to air defence. Additionally, citizens have reported enemy troop groupings and movements through smartphone applications, accelerating the military’s ISR and targeting cycles. ‘Liveuamap’ (Live universal awareness map) is one example of a mobile geospatial platform that uses artificial intelligence to sort data submitted by both citizen and military users to build a unified COP.2 There are more exquisite weapon systems that can similarly contribute ISR collection to targeting cycles and COPs, but none so distributed and cost-efficient as the common smartphone.
Ukraine has not been the only one to embrace smartphones, though. Russian troops positioned close to the front lines have been using phones and tablets to record Ukrainian artillery acoustically. With microphones from at least three smart devices, they can detect the time delay in sound waves reaching each microphone and then transmit that data to a centralized system, thereby triangulating the artillery’s origin.3 Conceptually, this capability has been on the battlefield before, but not through such a commercially available medium or in such an agile manner that results in destructive effects within minutes.
As both sides continue to use smartphones on the battlefield, OPSEC concerns will only increase. In March of 2022, the Wagner Group intercepted signals transmitting from over a dozen UK country code phone numbers as they attempted to connect to nearby cell towers deep within Ukraine. These transmissions enabled Russian targeting, leading to 30 cruise missiles striking a Ukrainian training facility.4 There have even been reports of Russian UASs mimicking cell towers to conduct surveillance.5 Evidently, greater connectivity may lead to corresponding efforts to intercept and exploit such signals.
Besides increased connectivity in cyberspace to improve ISR and targeting cycles, Ukraine has employed satellite communications such as Starlink to maintain C2 and ISR. Starlink has provided resilient connectivity despite Russian attempts at cyber- and electronic-warfare, maintaining services when terrestrial infrastructure or other satellite services were unavailable or denied. This connectivity preserved Ukrainian tactical, operational, and strategic OODA loops, thereby enabling decision-making agility.
Tactically, Ukraine devised methods to conduct real-time targeting, correction of artillery fires, and battle damage assessment (BDA) through live video feeds transmitted from their UASs through Starlink.6 By using satellite communications for beyond-line-of-sight targeting, Ukraine accelerated one of their targeting cycles from 20 minutes to one minute by removing a unit that acted merely as an intermediary to relay information between what used to be spotters with binoculars, and artillery teams.7 It is an ideal demonstration of how the air, space, and land domains can operate in synchronization with one another near the front lines while relying on the concept of mission command. The operators knew their objective and were able to coordinate tactical responsibilities across three domains to deliver effects without requiring higher headquarters intervention or support.
Enhanced connectivity accelerates OODA loops above the tactical levels too. Similar to the Ukraine’s mobile application platforms, field units developed distributed network pathways to relay their updated battlefield picture and BDA to higher command planners. The enhanced situation awareness clarifies the constant observations and orientation that commanders at the operational level need for agile decision-making. Finally, at the strategic level, resilient connectivity through Starlink maintained internet access in the more common ways that citizens use it. In the words of a US Defense Innovation Unit official, it ‘totally destroyed [Vladimir] Putin’s information campaign’. Russia was never able to silence President Zelenskyy during the initial phases of the war because most Ukrainians had enough access to news to maintain situational awareness of their surroundings.8 They ultimately were also able to carry on basic functions of their daily lives such as communication with friends and family. However, in the cities that were blockaded and lacked Starlink connectivity, many residents were falsely convinced by Russians that Ukraine itself did not exist anymore, offering a grim view of what could have occurred had satellite communications not been an option.
When capabilities are distributed across numerous assets, they become more difficult to target. Starlink’s resilience is due to its distributed nature in which a constellation of ‘affordable’ small satellites (less than $500k) in low Earth orbit (LEO) replace the need for large, individual satellites parked in geostationary orbit (GEO for $100-400M each).9 This concept of establishing resilience via distribution has parallels to the emergence of many small commercial UASs achieving the same effects that historically more exquisite air platforms in smaller numbers would provide. The rapid deployment, mobility, reduced cost, and widespread availability of Starlink demonstrated the advantage in leveraging commercially available technologies in modern warfare to maintain a decision cycle advantage. Despite jamming attempts, Starlink has remained resilient in a competitive electromagnetic environment due to its distributed architecture and Starlink’s agile responses when challenged.
While Ukraine’s use of COTS technology has offered immediate benefits, their units did experience limitations in satellite coverage once entering areas previously held by Russia. Starlink had adjusted its satellite footprint to deactivate service in Russian-occupied areas to prevent Russian forces from using the satellite communications. Unfortunately, that led to trouble once Ukrainians entered those zones. Starlink is ultimately a private company without up-to-date intelligence and situational awareness, and so was not standing by to immediately reactivate services to liberated zones. As some Ukrainian soldiers advanced into these liberated zones, they noticed that they were disconnected from Starlink. This ‘catastrophic’ loss of connectivity led to panic and confusion from some of them who then began calling in to help lines to get clarity on their situation.10 Therefore, NATO can expand the same concepts of dispersed capabilities to connect sensors and shooters, but to a scale that harnesses the resources of a 32-nation Alliance. Instead of relying solely on commercial services outside of tactical control, NATO nations can integrate their own robust LEO constellations to supplement commercial services like Starlink from orbit. These integrated networks would diversify the means of network transport that already exist through the other four domains. One emerging example is the US Space Development Agency’s (SDA) Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture (PWSA).
US Space Development Agency’s PWSA
The recent investment in LEO satellites is a significant trend for both public and private spheres, and the PWSA is an example of one military embracing this trend. Within the context of the space domain, proliferated satellite constellations are defined as deploying larger numbers of the same payloads or systems of the same types to perform the same missions.11 In particular, proliferated constellations in LEO offer worldwide, persistent coverage and take advantage of their relatively low altitude to minimize latency and power requirements without sacrificing coverage. The PWSA will increase connectivity to accelerate targeting and ISR cycles and enhance C2 through its layered architecture. The seven layers that comprise this architecture can be seen in Figure 2. Each layer corresponds to a function performed by the PWSA. The seven layers include the Transport Layer, Tracking Layer, Custody Layer, Battle Management Layer, Emerging Capabilities Layer, Navigation Layer, and Support Layer. In total, some specific examples of what the seven layers will offer are:
- Low-latency data transport of tactical data links, such as Link-16,
- Detection and tracking of advanced missile threats, to include hypersonics,
- Beyond line-of-sight monitoring of time-critical land and maritime targets,
- Space-based contribution to Combined Joint All Domain Command and Control (CJADC2), and more.
The SDA is implementing each layer through an agile spiral model to rapidly progress through acquisition cycles in two-year tranches. This aggressive approach heavily prioritizes maintaining the deployment schedule to minimize delayed capability delivery to warfighters. That is because the time from design to launch for historically expensive, non-distributed space capabilities meant that the battlefield may have changed by the time the satellite was operational. In their words, they prioritize their two-year tranche timelines to field a ’good-enough’ product for the warfighter now, rather than risking a perfect solution too late.12
As emerging and disruptive technology is introduced, constant designing and launching of proliferated constellations allow for responsiveness in meeting the needs of the tactical warfighter. Instead of relying on satellites with life spans of at least 15 years, the small satellites in proliferated LEO constellations often have five-year life spans, and for the case of the PWSA, capability for on-orbit upgrades in the interim. The shorter life span may appear negative at first, but the constant satellite replenishment of these constellations, known as reconstitution, increases flexibility in orbit because these new architectures are designed to be scalable, modular, and upgradeable.
Proliferated constellations provide a resilient method to obtain and deliver time-relevant COPs, ISR and targeting data, and overall C2 beyond line-of-sight. Due to their dispersion, these constellations are also better positioned to withstand electromagnetic interference due to multiple satellites always being in view of the user at any given time. For the PWSA, each satellite in the Transport Layer is equipped with multiple links and active phased array antennas to resiliently connect with airborne, ground-based, or maritime assets.13 This Transport Layer is the network backbone that the other PWSA Layers rely on, so its resilience is critical. Each satellite in this layer also crosslinks with nearby satellites via optical communication terminals which are inherently immune to radio frequency jamming. As for cybersecurity, the SDA is implementing a zero-trust framework which will maximize protection against malicious cyber actors.14 Lastly, the distribution of numerous lesser-valued assets deters kinetic effects against the satellites due to the sheer number of satellites that would need to be destroyed.
It is hard to understate the impacts to ISR that proliferated LEO constellations like the PWSA can bring to the Alliance. As the battlefield constantly evolves, the Alliance will have to accelerate its decision cycles to maintain pace. By connecting the sensor to shooter in real-time through interoperable mediums such as the PWSA, air defence system operators receive warnings and cues faster, and target-worthy overhead collection reaches the tactical planners faster. As data throughput becomes increasingly vital on the battlefield, a proliferated LEO architecture promotes connectivity through its low latency and persistent coverage. While Ukraine has innovated their capabilities to obtain real-time ISR with small drones, smartphones, and Starlink, an alliance as large as NATO can achieve the same on a grander scale while harnessing all five domains.
Correspondingly to ISR benefits, integrating space into C2 also provides robustness and timeliness to such a critical function. As it stands today, NATO communications traverse across domains via terrestrial line-of-sight. Even with airborne assets, this may be limited to a range of roughly 600 kilometres due to the curvature of the Earth. However, situational awareness and decision-making requires connectivity between operations centres, commanders, field units, and airborne and maritime platforms that may span greater distances. By having a distributed network like the PWSA’s Transport Layer, C2 can be dispersed farther to facilitate mission command, similarly to how Ukraine leveraged satellite communications to link their sensors to shooters in less time. Since the Transport Layer’s architecture is interoperable, even if its satellites use the most advanced link technology, there are on-board gateways that can convert multiple data links into the necessary formats for the end users. In other words, a ground unit using legacy SATCOM equipment can still connect to the Transport Layer due to formatting conversions that occur onboard the satellite. Then the transmission has a variety of paths it can take crosslinking through other satellites to get to its final destination. Ultimately, the warfighter should not care how many times the data re-formats, crosslinks, downlinks, or transits various orbital planes and regimes, as long as they are connected. An interoperable, plug-and-play approach is the best way to promote cross-domain connectivity and prevent technological stovepipes.
Showcasing its commitment to interoperability, the SDA has already succeeded in demonstrating orbit-to-ground Link-16 connectivity from a satellite for the first time ever.15 By offering ground, maritime, and air platforms a persistent and resilient satellite network to share Link-16 data across domains and beyond line of sight, the resulting enhancement in tactical connectivity should accelerate tactical decision-making cycles, similar to how Ukraine connected their small UAS ISR feeds to artillery batteries via Starlink. Next the SDA will aim to test Link-16 connectivity from satellites with NATO partners in exercises with the goal of global coverage for Link-16 soon thereafter.16
Conclusion
Contemporary conflict has been marked by accelerating decision-cycles that dramatically shorten the time from sensor to shooter through distributed and diverse network paths. Ukraine has devised innovative methods to expand the reach of their ISR capabilities to observe and orient with small UASs and smartphones, while finding new commercial mediums to decide and act both from terrestrial and space C2. NATO must expand on these concepts by integrating distributed networks to expand robust, real-time connectivity. Resilience is best achieved when C5ISR is integrated across all five domains through an interoperable and distributed architecture. For Ukraine, this meant ISR and C2 connectivity with ordinary smartphones and Starlink. For NATO nations, this may be proliferated LEO constellations as one means to connect the sensor, shooter, and C2 links, significantly accelerating ISR and targeting cycles. Will NATO capabilities and doctrine innovate ahead of our adversaries and successfully adapt to this evolution of the battlefield, or will NATO remain reliant on legacy, centralized operational processes which may risk bottlenecks?
