Introduction
The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has challenged current capabilities and military planner’s assumptions, highlighting the ever-evolving nature of warfare, where superiority is achieved by staying ‘one step ahead’ of the adversary. Observing the conduct of the Russo-Ukraine war, it has become evident that the notion of air superiority, a cornerstone of Western military strategy, is no longer achieved by fielding a better air force. Just as the advent of aircraft revolutionized warfare a century ago, emerging technical and tactical advancements are dramatically reshaping the battlefield. This transformation underscores the necessity for a nuanced understanding of layered air superiority, encompassing everything from drones and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to space-based assets and cyber capabilities. This article aims to explore these multifaceted dynamics and provoke thought on the future of air superiority and its implications for Multi-Domain Operations (MDO).
The Evolution of Air Superiority
Traditionally, air superiority1 has been understood as the ability of a nation’s air force to conduct operations without prohibitive interference from opposing forces. This concept has been the bedrock of military planning since the First World War, when controlling the skies became pivotal. However, the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict and the ongoing war in Ukraine have demonstrated that this paradigm is shifting.
One of the most striking aspects of the recent conflicts has been the extensive use of drones on both sides. Compared to cruise and ballistic missiles, drones are relatively inexpensive assets used throughout the kill chain, from intelligence and surveillance to cheap, precise munitions, creating effects with reduced risk to friendly personnel. The proliferation of unmanned systems has made it clear that air superiority is no longer solely defined by manned aircraft.
Integrated anti-access area denial (A2AD) systems have complicated the air superiority equation. Long-range and mobile surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) coupled with Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities dynamically increase the risk of manned aircraft requiring additional or better capabilities in those contested areas.
The conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia in 2020 over Nagorno-Karabakh illustrates the transformative impact drones are beginning to have on modern warfare.2 Azerbaijan’s extensive use of Turkish and Israeli drones, including the Bayraktar TB2 and Harop loitering munitions, effectively neutralized Armenia’s air defences and impacted ground forces. This conflict marked a significant shift in the military perception of air superiority, highlighting the vulnerabilities of traditional air defence systems against a swarm of low-cost, expendable, and agile UAVs. The success of Azerbaijan’s drone strategy underscored the necessity of integrating counter-UAV technologies and adaptive tactics within modern air defence frameworks.
Traditional Surface-Based Air Defence (SBAD) systems have become prime targets for drones, as the current capabilities and employment doctrine are often insufficient to counter these new and rapidly changing threats.3 Protection against drones, therefore, requires innovative approaches beyond just enhancing current SBAD capabilities. 100% protection was never feasible, and even less so under the current development. Instead, we must focus on operational resilience and adaptability, moving away from a ‘full coverage’ mentality towards one that emphasizes war readiness and pragmatic defence.
Current events have forced a re-evaluation of tactics once considered sacrosanct, highlighting the vulnerability of even the most advanced aircraft and SBAD to asymmetric threats. Whether air superiority as a binary ‘yes or no’ category is still relevant in an age where drones can operate below traditional air defences and achieve comparable effects is increasingly pertinent. This could lead to a new definition of air superiority or a fundamental change in the related air doctrine. The ability of drones to sneak past high-altitude Defensive Counter Air (DCA)and directly threaten ground-based assets necessitates reevaluating traditional air superiority concepts. This shift highlights the need for integrated C-UAS (Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems) capabilities within a layered air defence strategy to address these threats effectively.
Technical and Tactical Innovations
The advancements in drone technology and SBAD systems are just the tip of the iceberg, as there are emerging threats in hypersonic, very-high-altitude UAS, and space capabilities. The modern battlefield is increasingly characterized by its interconnected nature, where actions in one domain can have significant repercussions in others. This interconnectedness is particularly evident in the realm of air superiority.
The widespread use of drones in Ukraine has demonstrated their value not only in surveillance but also in direct attack roles.4 These systems can operate in environments where traditional aircraft might be too vulnerable or costly to deploy. Their ability to gather real-time intelligence and deliver precision strikes has proven to be a game-changer.
Adversaries’ anti-access systems have coupled multiple sensors and EW to high-end missiles, significantly increasing the risk to manned aircraft. These systems can accurately detect, track, and engage targets, making it difficult even for stealth aircraft to operate with impunity. The presence of these systems has forced air forces to develop new tactics and countermeasures, including drones and counter-drone systems. Addressing the threat posed by drones requires effectively integrating them into our own forces. This is not only to gain offensive capabilities but also to explore and plan with these capabilities to anticipate adversaries’ use. This includes developing doctrines for use, ensuring seamless integration with manned systems, and leveraging their reconnaissance, surveillance, and precision strike capabilities. Furthermore, the challenge of distinguishing between friend and foe in a drone-saturated environment, where many platforms are similar in appearance and electronic signature, such as commercial DJI drones, complicates the operational picture. Their similar appearance and numbers necessitate advanced identification and tracking systems and integrated command and control resistant to cyber and electronic warfare.
Specifically, the space and cyber realms have become integral to modern warfare, profoundly influencing air superiority. Cyberattacks can disrupt communication and control systems, rendering air assets ineffective or degrading their capabilities. Electronic warfare, including jamming and spoofing, can degrade the effectiveness of both offensive and defensive air operations. Satellites in modern warfare are closely tied to the cyber realm, and their importance cannot be overstated. They provide critical communication links, navigation support, and intelligence-gathering capabilities. However, they are vulnerable to anti-satellite weapons, cyber-attacks, and EW, which can have cascading effects on air operations.
These brief examples clearly demonstrate that the air domain is a constantly evolving dynamic battlespace. Our panel discussion aims to provide further insight into how technological advancements will shape the future of air warfare.
Multi-Domain Operations and Layered Air Superiority
The evolving nature of air superiority necessitates a broader, multi-domain approach to military operations. The concept of layered air superiority recognizes that air control is influenced by actions and capabilities across various domains, including land, sea, cyber, and space. Ground forces rely heavily on air support for reconnaissance, close air support, and logistics. Conversely, air operations depend on ground-based radar and missile systems for protection and targeting. The interplay between land and air domains is critical for operational effectiveness and campaign execution. Establishing air superiority now requires robust cyber and electronic warfare capabilities in addition to traditional assets. Protecting communication networks and disrupting enemy systems are essential tasks that must be integrated into air operations planning. Satellites provide essential support for air operations but must be protected from adversarial actions. Enhancing the resilience of space-based assets, developing countermeasures, and resilience to anti-satellite threats are crucial components of maintaining air superiority.
Outlook and Future Considerations
As we look to the future, the concept of air superiority will continue to evolve. The lessons from Ukraine underscore the importance of adaptability and innovation in military strategy. To maintain an edge, nations must invest in advanced technologies and develop integrated, multi-domain approaches to warfare. Three critical lessons from the Ukrainian conflict are:
- The necessity of layered, and cost-effective defence strategies.
- The importance of both quantity and quality of forces and systems.
- The disruptive nature of drone warfare.
The concept of ‘layered defence’,5 exemplified by Ukraine’s use of the Sky Fortress detection system, has proven highly effective. Sky Fortress enhances the detection capabilities of air threats, allowing Ukraine to deploy less expensive countermeasures first. For instance, drones and SHAHED cruise missiles are often engaged with machine guns and Stinger missiles, which are far more economical than high-value systems like SAMP/T or PATRIOT. This layered use of resources greatly improves Ukraine’s cost to defend, both in absolute terms and relative to Russia’s cost to attack, preserving costly and sophisticated assets for more significant threats or use as a last resort. By leveraging superior detection and integrating various layers of defence, Ukraine has demonstrated how nations can maximize the efficiency and sustainability of their air defence efforts, ensuring that high-value systems are reserved for critical situations while maintaining robust protection against a wide range of aerial threats.6
A critical lesson from recent conflicts is: ‘Quantity has a Quality all of its own.’7 The sheer volume of drones and inexpensive ballistic missiles can overwhelm even the most sophisticated high-tech air defence systems. This principle has been vividly demonstrated in various theatres of conflict, where mass-produced, cost-effective aerial threats have posed significant challenges to well-equipped militaries. The ability to field large numbers of drones and missiles at a fraction of the cost of advanced aircraft or complex missile systems shifts the strategic balance, compelling military planners to consider qualitative and quantitative factors in their defence strategies.
Continued investment in drone technology, advanced anti-aircraft systems, and cyber capabilities is essential. These technologies will play a pivotal role in future conflicts and must be prioritized in defence planning. Furthermore, the dual-use potential of these systems must be recognized and leveraged. By developing systems that are not only capable of defending high-value military assets in times of crisis and war but are also effective in protecting civilian infrastructure and populations, nations can enhance their overall security posture. For instance, advanced anti-aircraft systems and drones can be deployed to safeguard sports events, sites of national significance, and other civilian targets from terrorist attacks. This dual-use approach ensures that the technology investments made for military purposes can also provide robust protection for civilian life and property, thereby offering a comprehensive security solution that addresses both military and civilian threats.
Military doctrines must evolve to reflect the changing nature of air superiority. This includes developing new tactics for operating in contested airspace and training personnel to operate across multiple domain mindsets. The conflict in Ukraine has underscored the necessity for adaptive doctrines and innovative tactics in modern warfare. A prime example of Ukrainian innovation is their use of the PATRIOT missile system in an updated version of the ‘SAMBUSH tactic,’8 – a combination of Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) and ambush strategies. This approach allows Ukraine to utilize the PATRIOT system not just in static defensive roles but in a more dynamic and agile manner. By repositioning PATRIOT batteries forward and setting up ambushes, Ukrainian forces can effectively counter enemy aircraft and missiles with an element of surprise. This flexibility enhances the overall effectiveness of the PATRIOT system, making it a formidable tool in Ukraine’s air defence arsenal. By employing these tactics, the UKR forces make up for the deficit of air defence assets and increase the risk level for the attacking air force. The SAMBUSH tactic exemplifies how adapting traditional doctrines to incorporate new tactics can significantly enhance a nation’s defensive capabilities, allowing it to respond swiftly and efficiently to evolving threats on the battlefield.9 This approach maximizes high-value assets’ operational utility, ensuring a more resilient and proactive defence posture.
Modern warfare is interconnected and requires enhanced cooperation between allied nations. Sharing intelligence, coordinating cyber defence, and jointly developing new technologies will be critical for maintaining air superiority in a multi-domain environment.
In conclusion, the war in Ukraine has highlighted the shifting dynamics of air superiority. Integrating drones, advanced anti-aircraft systems, cyber capabilities, and space-based assets has fundamentally altered the multi-domain battlefield. As we move forward, it is imperative to embrace a layered approach to air superiority that recognizes the interplay between different domains and adapts to the ever-evolving nature of warfare. This will ensure that military forces are prepared to face future challenges and maintain their strategic advantage in the skies.
